Dr. King and the Battle for Hearts and Minds
Wendy B. Scott*
“In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”1
“[I]f physical death is the price that some must pay to free their children
from a permanent life of psychological death, then nothing could be more
honorable.”2
Foreword
In this Symposium, we are charged to imagine what Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
might think of the state of social justice in the twenty-first century. I have
chosen to consider whether Dr. King would believe that justice was served in
Parents Involved with regard to the constitutional right of children of color to
equal educational opportunity.
Dr. King’s descriptions and analyses of social injustice continue to inform any
query about what still needs to change in America. He spoke prophetically and
profoundly about systemic social injustice and its detrimental effect on the
human psyche. More importantly, his words inspired action that resulted in
lasting change in American society and the world. Therefore, I hope as you
read this Article that his words will speak to your heart and mind.
I.

Introduction

In 1954, a unanimous Supreme Court held that laws requiring dual public
school systems, separated solely on the basis of race, violated the rights
afforded to African American children under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses.3 Brown v. Board of Education marked the
beginning of a judicial assault on what the Court in Loving v. Virginia called
statutory schemes and state court decisions that served as “an endorsement of
the doctrine of White Supremacy.”4
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Both Chief Justice Earl Warren and Dr. King recognized that the practice of
White Supremacy did more than keep people separated. In Brown, Warren’s
opinion also validated the relevance of the psychic injury caused by what Dr.
King often referred to as “the iron feet of oppression.”5 Warren wrote that the
segregation of children solely based on race “generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.”6 While Warren’s conclusion remains hotly
debated, Brown introduced personal stigmatic injury into school desegregation
discourse. Dr. King embraced the centrality of the heart and mind in the struggle
for social justice.
Part II juxtaposes Dr. King’s thoughts on the evils of segregation and the
necessity of integration with the development of desegregation jurisprudence
after Brown. Part III traces the short-lived efforts of the federal judiciary to
integrate public schools following Dr. King’s death up to Parents Involved .
Part IV summarizes the Parents Involved decision and compares the plurality’s
legal and social visions to that of Brown and Plessy. Part V hypothesizes about
Dr. King’s reaction to Parents Involved and takes a closer look at the
importance of the heart and mind in the Brown opinion and Dr. King’s thinking.
In conclusion, I attempt to answer the prophetic question posed by Dr. King
near the end of his life: “Where do we go from here?,”7 in achieving and
sustaining racial diversity in public education.

II. School Desegregation During the King Era

Dr. King was born into a segregated America and attended segregated schools.
Despite his middle class upbringing, he knew from personal experience the
social stigma attached to his race. In his article, Pilgrimage to Nonviolence, Dr.
King wrote,
I grew up abhorring segregation, considering it both rationally
inexplicable and morally unjustifiable. I could never accept the fact of
having to go to the back of a bus or sit in the segregated section of a
train. The first time that I was seated behind a curtain in a dining car I
felt as if the curtain had been dropped on my selfhood.8
Like most civil rights leaders of his time, Dr. King advocated for racially
integrated schools.9 He believed that, “[a]ny law that degrades human
5
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personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation
distorts the soul and damages the personality.”10 He characterized segregation as
“an existential expression of man’s tragic separation, an expression of his awful
estrangement, his terrible sinfulness.”11
Dr. King spoke as a theologian. He was a man of faith, action and
compassionate reason. He distinguished compassionate reason from the reason
of liberalism, which he characterized as “[r]eason devoid of the purifying power
of faith.” 12 King’s religious convictions, more than his politics, informed his
worldview. His spiritual and intellectual journeys were one. In the words of his
late wife, Coretta Scott King, he promoted “religious responsibility in social
struggle.” 13 Therefore, throughout the course of his public ministry Dr. King
admonished America to obey Brown and reject the old order of segregation as
morally wrong.14 As King explained, “deeply rooted spiritual beliefs” were a
vital motivation for the embrace of nonviolence by the African American
community. 15
He also argued that true democracy and economic justice could not exist
without integration.16 He urged his followers to challenge the isolation of
African Americans and the poor from the benefits of society as part of the larger
problem of socioeconomic injustice.
A. King Distinguished Desegregation and Integration
In 1962, Dr. King explained his philosophy about racial integration during a
speech in Nashville,17 emphasizing the distinction between desegregation and
10
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integration. Desegregation, or simply “remov[ing] the legal and social
prohibitions” to integration, was “empty and shallow.”18 Integration, on the
other hand, was the true goal, because it was “more profound and far-reaching
than desegregation. Integration is the positive acceptance of desegregation and
the welcomed participation of Negroes into the total range of human
activities.”19
Dr. King captured the essence of the problem with stopping at desegregation,
instead of seeking full integration:
We do not have to look very far to see the pernicious effects of a
desegregated society that is not integrated. It leads to ‘physical
proximity without spiritual affinity.’ It gives us a society where men are
physically desegregated and spiritually segregated, where elbows are
together and hearts are apart. It gives us special togetherness and
spiritual apartness. It leaves us with a stagnant equality of sameness
rather than a constructive equality of oneness.20
He understood that
“the demands of desegregation are enforceable demands while the
demands of integration fall within the scope of unenforceable
demands . . . Desegregation will break down the legal barriers and
bring men together physically, but something must touch the hearts
and souls of men so that they will come together spiritually . . .
True integration will be achieved by true neighbors who are
willingly obedient to unenforceable obligations.21
In other words, while legislation and judicial decrees were “of inestimable value
in achieving desegregation,” they were only one step along the way to
integration.22 People must decide to act proactively to achieve full integration.
In an effort to move “hearts and souls” and encourage the will to act, Dr. King
offered several ethical justifications for integration. First, he argued that the
“sacredness of human personality” and our entitlement to “a legacy of dignity
and worth” required integration.23 Second, he explained that the denial of
integration was the denial of freedom and of life itself.24 Third, he asserted that
every person deserved to be treated with dignity, fourth, that freedom (achieved
through equality) is a requirement for life itself, and fifth that “integration is
recognition of the solidarity of the human family.”25 Finally he proclaimed that
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integration is right because “integration alone is consonant with our national
purpose.”26
Dr. King knew that integration would not occur without struggle. And so he
repeatedly called for African American citizens and their supporters to seek the
ballot, advocate for legal change, finance the movement for freedom and justice,
and “develop intelligent, courageous, dedicated leadership.”27 He sought leaders
who were “in love with justice” and humanity, not with publicity and money.28
In order to achieve freedom and justice, he called people “to rise above the
narrow confines of individualistic concerns to the broader concerns of all
humanity,”29 and to strive for “excellence in our various fields of endeavor.”30
Above all, Dr. King called for “love, mercy and forgiveness” to “stand at the
center of our lives.”31
Coretta Scott King noted that her husband had a “global vision for the future.”32
He saw the twentieth century as a time when we were “standing between two
worlds—the dying old and the emerging new.”33 The dying world was the world
of colonialism and imperialism where a Euro-American minority oppressed the
majority people of color across the globe. The emerging world would include
new nations coming from under “the iron feet of oppression” in Africa, Asia,
the Middle East and Eastern Europe.34 It would also include the end of apartheid
in America. Dr. King envisioned a “beloved community” based on
interdependence, love, equality, and hope.35
B. King’s Pragmatic View of Law

In discussing this vision for the future, Dr. King assessed many tools for
creating change. including the significant role of litigation.36 Part of the Civil
Rights Movement strategy was to use the law creatively to extend the
desegregation mandate of Brown to other areas of public accommodation.37 Dr.
26
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King often wove references to important pre-Brown precedent such as Dred
Scott v. Sandford,38 and Plessy v. Ferguson,39 into his messages showing that he
understood the power of the law to shape the social order.40
Initially for Dr. King, Brown v. Board of Education was more than a decision
declaring segregated schools unconstitutional. In his 1956 address at the First
Annual Institute on Non-Violence and Social Change he heralded the decision
as part of the changes that were ushering in a “new order of freedom and
justice.”41 Speaking of the significance of Brown, he said,
Along with the emergence of a ‘New Negro,’ with a new sense of
dignity and destiny, came that memorable decision of May 17, 1954. In
this decision, the Supreme Court of this nation unanimously affirmed
that the old Plessy doctrine must go. This decision came as a legal and
sociological death blow to an evil that had occupied the throne of
American life for several decades. It affirmed in no uncertain terms that
separate facilities are inherently unequal and that to segregate a child
because of his race is to deny him equal protection of the law. With the
coming of this great decision we could gradually see the old order of
segregation and discrimination passing away, and the new order of
freedom and justice coming into being.42
He characterized the call for the nullification of Brown in southern legislatures
and interposition against federal authority as “death groans from a dying
system.”43 This decision was one of many factors that led African Americans
to a “new sense of dignity and self respect.”44
While King advocated for full integration after Brown, in 1963, he began to
express frustration with the half-hearted efforts to enforce the desegregation
mandate. He wrote,
The Negro had been deeply disappointed over the slow pace of
school desegregation. He knew that in 1954 the highest court in
the land had handed down a decree calling for desegregation of
schools ‘with all deliberate speed.’ He knew that this edict from
the Supreme Court had been heeded with all deliberate delay.45
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Dr. King complained that at the beginning of 1963, only nine percent of
Southern black children were attending integrated schools.46
Dr. King attributed the dilatory pace of progress to the Supreme Court’s
decision to return remedial power to states with a mandate to act “with all
deliberate speed.”47 “The Negro,” he explained, “has been deeply disappointed
over the slow pace of school desegregation. He knew that in 1954, the highest
court in the land handed down a decree calling for desegregation of schools
‘with all deliberate speed’. He knew that this edict from the Supreme Court had
been heeded with all deliberate delay.” At this pace, he lamented, “it would be
the year 2054 before integration in [S]outhern schools would be a reality.”48
Moreover, virtually no efforts were in progress to dismantle segregation in
Northern school systems.49 In 1965, Dr. King observed that even in Northern
cities, “[s]chool segregation did not abate but increased” after Brown.50
In one of his last publications in 1967, Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or
Community?, Dr. King wrote, “we are now able to see why the Supreme Court
decisions on school desegregation, which we described at the time as historic,
have not made history.”51 The continuing disparity in financial resources
allotted to predominantly black schools also hindered the fulfillment of the
desegregation mandate.52
By 1968, fourteen years after Brown, Congress had declared illegal and the
federal courts had declared unconstitutional the practice of racial segregation
that encompassed every aspect of life in America.53 Yet Dr. King saw parallels
between the failed efforts to enforce civil rights during Reconstruction with the
slow enforcement of civil rights in the 1960s, stating, “[j]ust as the Congress
passed a civil rights bill in 1868 and refused to enforce it, the Congress passed a
civil rights bill in 1964 and to this day has failed to enforce it in all its
46
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dimensions.”54 In an essay published posthumously, Dr. King prophesied that,
“[j]ustice for black people will not flow into society merely . . . from fountains
of political oratory . . . . White America must recognize that justice for black
people cannot be achieved without radical changes in the structure of our
society. The comfortable, the entrenched, the privileged cannot continue to
tremble at the prospect of change in the status quo.”55
On April 4, 1968, the day of Dr. King’s death, the status quo of segregation in
public schools was still the norm.56
III. Normative Visions of Desegregation: From Integration to Unitary Status
A. The Integration Norm
After the Court’s remedial command in Brown v. Board of Education II to
desegregate “with all deliberate speed,”57 State officials and local school boards
resisted the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment required compulsory
integration.58 In furtherance of that resistance, school boards throughout the
South devised race-neutral desegregation policies intended to delay
integration.59 Lower courts charged with enforcing Brown condoned the use of
race-neutral plans,60 despite their obvious and intentional failure to achieve
54
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integration. But on May 27, 1968, almost two months after Dr. King’s death,
the Supreme Court finally demanded the affirmative and race-conscious
enforcement of Brown.61
In Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia, the Court
rejected the county school board’s race neutral “freedom of choice” plan, which
allowed students to choose where to enroll. The Court accused the school board
of the “deliberate perpetuation” of racially segregated schools.62 The Justices
called eleven years of delay “intolerable” and ordered “meaningful and
immediate progress.”63 While these plans were not per se unconstitutional, the
Court promised to strike down any plan that perpetuated segregation and to
uphold plans intended to convert segregated school systems to unitary school
systems.64
Green defined unitary status as the creation of “just schools” within one school
system. The Court mandated that recalcitrant school boards “fashion steps
which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a ‘white’
school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.”65 Justice Brennan concluded
that school boards operating racially segregated dual school systems at the time
of the Brown I and Brown II decisions had been ”clearly charged with the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps may be necessary to convert to a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”66
The Court next affirmed the broad scope of the federal courts’ remedial power
to order effective remedies. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of
Education, decided three years after Dr. King’s death, the Supreme Court once
again warned recalcitrant Southern school districts to cease their “deliberate
resistance” to judicial mandates.67 This time, Justice Burger wrote to “amplify
guidelines” for schools to follow to meet their constitutional obligations to
move from dual to unitary school systems.68 Specifically, the Court called for
school boards to “eliminate invidious racial distinctions” which existed in
“transportation, supporting personnel, and extracurricular activities . . . [as well
as] the maintenance of buildings and the distribution of equipment.”69 Further,
schools were instructed to pay special attention in teacher assignment.70
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As a result of the Court’s aggressive, albeit delayed intervention, the number of
racially integrated schools increased. After Swann, more than 100 districts
implemented desegregation plans.71 Northern states came under scrutiny by the
Court and were ordered to desegregate as well.72 Schools in the South
“maintained the relatively high levels of school integration under Green, Swann,
and civil rights regulations through 1988.”73 Unfortunately, Dr. King was not
alive to see the beginning of real progress towards desegregation.

B. From Integration to the Unitary Status Norm
Judicial support for integration quickly waned. Between 1971 and 1995,
judicial assault on Green and Swann came from several directions as part of the
Rehnquist federalism revolution intended to favor state over federal, or judicial
control generally. 74 In the meantime, former advocates of school integration
also began to question the efficacy of the approach.75 As the Supreme Court
became increasingly more conservative,76 more Justices began to emphasize the
importance of allowing lower courts to return school boards to local control,
even if schools within the system remained racially identifiable. Supervising
courts could declare school systems “unitary,” even if schools within the system
remained segregated, as long as the school board proved it had “complied in
good faith with the desegregation decree” and that “vestiges of past
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable.”77 As long as
school boards did not return to de jure segregation, or intentionally create
segregated schools in some manner, the Court would not intervene.78
71
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In a series of contentious decisions, the Court, by a bare majority, slowly
withdrew the authority of the federal judiciary to achieve meaningful integration
of students.79 The first assault on aggressive remedial measures to achieve
integration began with the 1974 decision Milliken v. Bradley.80 Realizing that
racially integrated schools could not be achieved within the largely black
Detroit school system, lower courts approved a desegregation plan that included
the surrounding white suburban schools. However, the Supreme Court rejected
the plan as an unconstitutional exercise of remedial power by the lower courts,
because an interdistrict remedy that included school systems that had not
practiced de jure segregation exceeded the equitable power of the federal courts.
Milliken severely limited the scope of the district courts’ equitable remedial
powers for the first time.81
Second, the Court foreclosed the possibility of urban and suburban school
districts working together voluntarily.82 In Missouri v. Jenkins the Kansas City
schools, under court order to desegregate, sought to attract white students
voluntarily from the surrounding suburban school districts (since Milliken
forbade court intervention) as a means of integrating the schools that were sixtyeight percent black. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court claimed that the pursuit of
“desegregative attractiveness” could not be reconciled with Milliken and other
cases that limited the district court’s remedial authority.83
The Court reasoned that since minority children attended schools “equipped
with facilities and opportunities not available anywhere else in the country,” the
district court should seek to restore state and local control of the still racially
segregated school system.84 In many respects, Jenkins assured the perpetuation
of “separate but equal” schools absent creative measures by local school boards
to avoid resegregation. The plans scrutinized by the Court in Parents Involved
represented efforts by local school boards to operate creatively within the
narrow confines of Jenkins and Milliken.
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Third, the Court held that the constitutional mandate of Brown did not call for
achieving racially balanced schools. According to Milliken, the constitutional
right of a Negro child is “to attend a unitary school system” in their district,85
not a racially balanced school within the system.86 Rather, when schools acted
in “good faith” to eliminate “the vestiges of past discrimination . . . to the extent
practicable,” a court-ordered desegregation decree could be dismissed even
when racial imbalance or single-race schools persisted in a school district.87
Therefore, a finding of unitary status ended the local school board’s legal
obligation to integrate schools.
Finally, the Court rejected arguments that racial segregation in housing
contributed to racial segregation in schools.88 The Court rejected evidence
which established a causal connection between state action and the creation of
segregated housing.89 This prevented school officials from accounting for
changing residential demographics in crafting desegregation plans.
Eventually school boards across the country began to argue that the multitude of
court-ordered local integration plans had succeeded in creating “unitary
systems.” The post-Milliken jurisprudence of the Court opened the way for
hundreds of school districts to be released from court-ordered desegregation.
School boards, however, continued to struggle with the question of racial
85
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imbalance and financial inequity. In other words, by releasing school boards
from judicial supervision, the Court set in motion a retreat to separate but equal.

C. The Persistence of Financial Inequity
After Brown, Dr. King decried both racial segregation and the continuing
disparity in financial resources allotted to predominantly black schools.
Following his death, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of unequal funding
of schools in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.90 Suit was filed on
behalf of school children from poor, mostly minority families living in school
districts with low property tax revenues, who complained that school districts
with higher property values had greater financial resources. The plaintiffs
sought the equitable distribution of tax revenues to create parity among school
districts. In Rodriguez, the Court rejected the claim that there is a fundamental
constitutional right to education that prohibits “relative differences in spending”
between school districts.91
Following Rodriquez, civil rights groups filed suits in various state courts
throughout the nation to challenge inequities in public school financing. The
arguments in these cases were based on state constitutions, which provided for a
fundamental constitutional right to quality education. Plaintiffs proffered
evidence to establish a clear pattern of revenue disparities between property-rich
and property-poor school districts, which result in disparities in district spending
per student. In cases where a court found that insufficient funding had resulted
in a state's failure to meet its constitutional duty, the court ordered the state to
restructure its state public school funding system.92
Interestingly, the fiscal equity litigation accepted the status quo of racial
segregation, focusing instead on parity in financing and the quality of education
received. The approach in these cases was strikingly similar to the NAACP
90

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 37.
92
In Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232 (Tenn. 2002), the Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that the public school funding system failed to comply with the state's
constitutional obligation to formulate and maintain a system of public education affording a
substantially equal educational opportunity to all students. In Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc.
v. New York, 801 N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003), the New York Court of Appeals held that New York
City schoolchildren were not receiving their constitutionally-mandated opportunity for a sound
basic education. High courts in Connecticut, Texas, West Virginia, New Jersey, and North
Carolina have also based decisions on school equity on the fundamental right to education
guaranteed under those states’ constitutions. See, e.g., Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1273
(Conn. 1996) (striking down Connecticut’s school finance scheme and requiring the state to
examine financial inequities in light of racial isolation in the school systems); Edgewood Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989) (ruling that Texas’s school financing
system violated the state constitutional requirement for an “efficient” system of public
education); Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099, 1107 (Conn. 1985) (declaring the state system of
educational financing to achieve statewide equity constitutional).
91

13

Legal Defense Fund’s pre-Brown strategy of challenging the “equal” prong of
the “separate but equal” doctrine to remedy disparities in teachers’ salaries,
book budgets, and money spent on school buildings. 93 But while arguing for
schools to be “equal” was part of the overall strategy in the 1940s and 1950s to
confront apartheid and reverse Plessy’s “separate but equal” doctrine, the fiscal
equity litigation of the 1970s did not seek to directly challenge schools’ status as
racially separate.94

IV. The Roberts Court Speaks on School Desegregation
In 2007, the plurality of a fractured Supreme Court held that school boards
seeking to perpetuate racial diversity violated the Equal Protection rights of a
small number of white children denied admission to already predominantly
white schools.95 Although a majority of the Court, through concurrence and
dissent, found the use of race-conscious remedies to perpetuate diversity
constitutional,96 the plurality’s approach would virtually end the federal
judiciary’s desegregation mandate. The plurality attempted to do so by
conflating the use of race conscious remedies to end unconstitutional
segregation in education with the use of race in numerous local school boards
across America to maintain the racial integration achieved after Green and
Swann, and to prevent resegregation.

A. A View of Segregation, South and North
Cases challenging legal segregation from Delaware, South Carolina, Virginia,
and Kansas were consolidated to comprise the Brown decision. The post-Brown
remedies primarily targeted school systems in the former states of the
confederacy, including Kentucky. Northern and Western states, like
Washington, would eventually grapple with the reality of de facto segregation
that produced the same results as segregation by law. Ultimately, the mandate
of Brown to desegregate schools reached across the entire nation leaving
virtually no state untouched.
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While Louisville and Seattle both voluntarily sought to perpetuate and further
integration gains achieved during the Green/Swann era, they started from
different ends of the country. Desegregation efforts in some areas of the North
and West rivaled that in the South. As Dr. King discovered traveling across the
nation, “[T]he straightjackets of race prejudice and discrimination do not wear
only southern labels. The subtle, psychological technique of the North has
approached in its ugliness and victimization of the Negro the outright terror and
open brutality of the South.”97 The history of school desegregation in Seattle
shows, as King discovered, that negative attitudes about integration generally
associated with southern cities like Louisville were not confined to the South.
Seattle had never operated under a court order to desegregate, but segregated
housing patterns made it necessary for the school board to use race as a factor in
school assignments to achieve diversity and avoid racial isolation within the
school system.98 In fact, in 1989, state housing officials permitted a tax credit
for low and moderate-income homebuyers who bought homes in places that
would aid school integration.99 After Jenkins, however, the Seattle School
Board unanimously voted between1996 and 1998 to end mandatory busing.100
By 1999, Seattle school populations continued to mirror the pattern of
segregated housing.101 In a continuing effort to desegregate schools, Seattle
implemented a student assignment plan that used race as a “tie-breaker”
between 1998 and 2002 in the school assignment lottery.
After Brown, the Jefferson County public schools in Louisville, Kentucky
continued to operate segregated schools until placed under a court-ordered
desegregation plan from 1975-2000.102 In 2000, the district court declared that
the school board had, “to the extent practicable,” achieved unitary status.103
However, a year after being released from the decree, the school board chose to
create a “managed choice plan” to maintain integrated schools.104
Parents Involved addressed whether local school boards in both cities could
voluntarily remedy the existence of racially isolated schools without a new
finding of intentional discrimination. The Court also looked at whether the
97
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Constitution allows local school officials to include consideration of racial
diversity in student assignment plans. Respondents argued that promoting
diversity to maintain integration and avoiding resegregation constitute
compelling state interests. The Court splintered on both issues.
B. A Fractured Court Grapples With Race
The decision included two “majority” opinions and one “plurality.”105 The
Roberts majority, including Justice Kennedy, struck down both plans as not
narrowly tailored to the educational goals asserted by the school districts.106 The
parts of Roberts’s opinion that Justice Kennedy did not join avoided deciding
whether diversity and avoiding resegregated, racially isolated schools were
compelling state interests that justified considering race in K-12 school
assignments.107 First, Roberts distinguished the diversity interest approved in
Grutter v. Bollinger from the diversity interest in the present case.108 Second,
he reasoned that the alleged compelling interests were merely a restatement of
the concept of “racial balancing.”109 However, the Breyer dissenters,110 coupled
with Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion,111 formed a majority view that
diversity in K-12 education and avoiding resegregated or racially isolated
schools are compelling state interests.
Doctrinally, the Robert’s plurality approached the issues with narrow,
mechanical application of stare decisis.112 The plurality saw no need for the
Seattle and Louisville school systems to remedy the continued existence of
segregated schools, despite the educational disadvantages attributed to the
perpetuation of racially isolated schools. According to the plurality, achieving
unitary status in the Louisville school under the Dowell/ Freeman criteria
removed the "remedying effects of past segregation" justification that would
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make race-conscious admissions decisions constitutionally permissible.113
Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that “the Constitution is not violated by racial
imbalance in the schools, without more.”114 Thus, the plurality opinion carried
the potential to permanently institutionalize separate and unequal racially
identifiable public schools.115 Moreover, as Justice Stevens’s dissent explained,
the plurality “rewrites the history”116 of Brown by implying that de jure
segregation invidiously denied equal education to white children.117 This
revisionist colorblind interpretation of school desegregation jurisprudence
exemplified disloyalty to Brown.118
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence ensured that promoting diversity and avoiding
racial isolation in America’s public schools can be compelling state interests in
narrowly tailored school assignment plans. Justice Kennedy characterized the
plurality’s view as “an all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor”
and “too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all
people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.”119 He declined to
endorse the Chief Justice’s opinion, which he viewed as “open to the
interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore the
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problem of de facto resegregation in schooling.”120 He concluded that the
plurality was “profoundly mistaken” to suggest that the Constitution mandates
that state and local school authorities accept the status quo of racial isolation in
schools.121 Most notably, Justice Kennedy rejected the plurality’s colorblind
constitutionalism.122 “In the real world, it is regrettable to say, [constitutional
colorblindness] cannot be a universal constitutional principle.”123

Justice Stevens accused the plurality of misusing precedent, citing the
mischaracterization of some of his past opinions as an example.124 Justice
Stevens contended that he, and several other justices, consistently adhered to the
view that “a decision to exclude a member of a minority because of his race is
fundamentally different from a decision to include a member of a minority for
that reason.”125 He pointed out that the only precedent employed to support the
plurality’s claim that strict scrutiny must apply in evaluating all uses of race by
the government were other plurality decisions.126
Another point of contention among the justices was the meaning of Swann.
Justice Breyer quoted extensively from Swann to support the view of the
dissenters that the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use
race-conscious criteria even when they are not compelled to do so by the
Constitution. Specifically, he pointed out that in Swann, a unanimous Court
wrote,
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude . .
. that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each
120
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school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students
reflecting the proportion of the district as a whole. To do this as an
educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school
authorities.127
The plurality considered this language to be dicta and only relevant in cases
involving judicial findings of de jure segregation.128 Conversely, the dissenters
viewed this language as stating “a basic principle of constitutional law.”129
By rejecting the Seattle and Louisville plans, the opinion created the impression
that colorblind constitutionalism hold sway in the entire Court. But in fact the
opinion did not declare the goal of diversity in public schools unconstitutional.
Ultimately, the Court extended Grutter to establish the proposition that diversity
in all public education constitutes a compelling state interest, which justifies the
consideration of race in student assignment. In addition to diversity and
remedying the effects of past discrimination,130 five justices also accepted as
compelling the use of race in decision making to avoid de facto resegregation.
Thus, the fractured Court sent the nation’s school boards back to the drawing
board to use diversity in school assignment decisions in a more narrowly
tailored plan.
C. The Spirit of Plessy Resurrected
The doctrinal schism on the Roberts Court created some uncertainty for local
school boards. But these cases resonated more loudly because of the spirit and
tone of the plurality opinion and the opposition to that spirit by Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence and the Justices Stevens and Breyer’s dissents.
Unlike Brown, the Parents Involved plurality expressed no concern for the
“hearts and minds” of children. Instead, their opinion resurrected the spirit of
Plessy v. Ferguson.131 Plessy, like opponents of affirmative action, considered
the idea that segregation generated feelings of inferiority a fallacious
assumption.132 The Plessy Court asserted that segregation “stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority . . . solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction on it.”133 The Brown Court, conversely, accepted the
rudimentary social science research of the time establishing a causal
127
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relationship between racial segregation and a sense of inferiority in the heart
and mind.134 Since Brown, “the social science evidence on the educational
benefits of integrated education for all students has become more definitive.”135
The preponderance of findings from the long-range social science, behavioral,
and educational research demonstrates that “racial composition matters for
educational outcomes.”136
The Roberts Court reviewed this extensive research on the benefits of integrated
education submitted in the Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents.137 The Brief concurred with the school boards that
race-conscious student assignment policies are necessary to maintain racially
desegregated schools. The social scientists submitted extensive documentation
to establish that racial integration promotes cross-racial understanding, reduces
racial prejudice, improves critical thinking and academic achievement, affords
greater life opportunities, reduces residential segregation, increases parental
involvement, and better prepares students for a diverse workforce. Their
research also showed that students in racially isolated minority schools
experienced higher teacher turnover, lower teacher quality, less beneficial crosscultural exposure, and lower educational outcomes.138 The plurality, however,
considered this evidence inconclusive.139

V. Dr. King and the Battle for Hearts and Minds

We come now to the question, how would Dr. King respond to whether justice
was served in Parents Involved with regard to the constitutional rights to equal
educational opportunity . Clarence Jones suggested that Dr. King always
looked for answers “by working backwards to find the source of the
problem.”140 For Dr. King, the problem of segregated and underfunded
education was part of the larger problem of poverty, racial hierarchy, and
injustice. In answering the question, “Where do we go from here?,” Dr. King
134
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stated, “[W]e must honestly face the fact that the [Civil Rights M]ovement must
address itself to the question of restructuring the whole of American society.”141
Dr. King taught that oppression and social injustice crushed the inner spirit.
He tied racism, economic exploitation and war together as the “triple evil”142
That resulted in oppression and injustice. He believed that these evils caused
injury to the heart and mind. The idea of “heart and mind” refers to our entire
mental and moral activity. His concern for the heart and mind far exceeded even
that of the Brown Court and flowed from his call to preach the Gospel.
He repeatedly described how centuries of rationalizing the inferiority of
Africans and other people of color led Europeans to believe their own socially
constructed lies about their racial supremacy. Dr. King wrote,
In their relations with Negroes, white people discovered that they had
rejected the very center of their own ethical professions . . . . White men
soon came to forget that the southern social culture and all its
institutions had been organized to perpetuate this rationalization. They
observed a caste system and quickly were conditioned to believe that its
social results, which they had created, actually reflected the Negro’s
innate and true nature.143
In other words, the socially constructed paradigms of racial inferiority and racial
superiority became the entrenched norms from colonial America to the present.
In Loving v. Virginia144 the Court finally acknowledged that the struggle for
racial equality was not simply against segregation; the struggle was against
White Supremacy.145 Recent displays of racial domination, such as the spate of
people hanging nooses in public, suggest the internalized sense of superiority
that continues to influence the hearts and minds of some white Americans
today.146
Dr. King also examined the impact of long-term systemic racial injustice and
brutality on African Americans. Physical slavery ended, but “mental slavery”
continued.147 “In time,” he wrote, “many Negroes lost faith in themselves and
came to believe that perhaps they really were what they had been told they
were—something less than men.” 148 It concerned Dr. King that numbers of
141
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African Americans, especially in the South, had internalized this belief in their
own inferiority to keep “racial peace.”149 Moreover, he characterized life for
African Americans in Northern inner-city as living in the “triple ghetto” of race,
poverty, and human misery.150
So much of the pathology Dr. King described in his early writings continues to
resonate in American society.151 Dr. King might agree that there is a causal
connection between the deterioration of the black family, artistic expressions
that degrade women and glorify crime, and the internalized sense of
unworthiness he often discussed. Dr. King’s lawyer and long-time friend
believes that the still-wounded hearts and minds that manifest in the form of
intra-community violence would “overwhelm” Dr. King.152
Dr. King hoped that the struggle for civil and human rights would result in a
more self confident, less fearful people emerging from the Black community to
fight against inequality.153 He embraced aspects of Black Power that promoted
recovery from the burdens of perpetual oppression. In a 1968 interview, before
the annual convention of the Rabbinical Assembly, Dr. King explained that
Black Power was desperately needed in the black community. “Black people
have been ashamed of themselves,”154 because they have been characterized as
inferior for centuries.155 And so the man of faith called for love-centered, nonviolent revolution.156
Dr. King challenged Americans to have the moral courage to stand united to
free our children from “a permanent life of psychological death”157 caused by
the message of inferiority aimed at the heart and mind. Dr. King considered
education as one benefit that would forestall a “psychological death” for many
African American and poor children. Therefore, Dr. King would most likely
view the plurality decision as having wounded the cause of social justice
generally and racial justice specifically.
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The principle of heart-and-mind injury in law is referred to as stigmatic injury.
The notion of stigmatic injury in school desegregation and affirmative action
case law has been critiqued for its use and misuse. On the one hand,
contemporary social scientists overwhelmingly reject the stigmatic injury
theory, in part because it has been used to imply that African Americans and
predominately black educational institutions are in fact inferior. 158 On the other
hand, opponents of affirmative action appropriated the stigmatic injury theory to
argue that affirmative action, not discrimination, has engendered a sense of
inferiority in minority students.159 In response, proponents argue that affirmative
action removes the stigma of inferiority by opening the door to opportunities for
more interaction across racial lines.160
Controversy continues to surround claims like those of Dr. King and the Brown
Court that slavery, subsequent de jure segregation, and the resulting societal
discrimination created a sense of inferiority about and among the oppressed.161
While Dr. King supported efforts to empower African Americans economically
and politically, he repeatedly and effectively stressed the importance of
acknowledging the adverse psychological effects that resulted from the deeply
entrenched legal paradigm of white superiority and black inferiority.162 Given
his emphasis on affirming the value of human dignity, the Roberts Court’s
plurality opinion would fall short in his eyes on that count.
Dr. King, of course, was pragmatic about the inability of the law to change
hearts and minds. While he applauded the major role of legislation and judicial
decrees in the social justice movement, he often noted that “[m]orality cannot be
legislated,” but “behavior can be regulated. Judicial decrees may not change the

158

Wendy Brown-Scott, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Integrative Ideal, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
535, 541–42 (1994) (explaining how Marshall used the stigmatic injury theory to support the
injury claim in Brown).
159
For a typical expression of opposition to affirmative action and diversity programs, see
THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 16, 37-60 (1984) (arguing against
race-based differential treatment because it is premised on a belief in the “innate inferiority” of
blacks). See also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 5-9 (2000) (summarizing the
affirmative action debate); Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in
American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 481 (2004) (arguing that “blacks are the victims
of affirmative action, not the beneficiaries”).
160
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
AMERICAN VALUES 78-83 (1996) (summarizing several justifications for supporting or opposing
affirmative action).
161
For an in-depth analysis of the adverse psychological effects of colonization, see generally
FRANZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1963).
162
The Supreme Court relied on the principle of white superiority and supremacy in numerous
cases. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). Even the dissent in Plessy, which disagreed with the endorsement of the separate but
equal doctrine as a matter of constitutional law, concurred that whites were superior to blacks.
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

23

heart, but they can restrain the heartless.”163 Perhaps, then the Parents Involved
plurality’s failure to take into account the evidence of the social and
psychological benefits that flow from racial diversity in the classroom,
especially in early education, would have disappointed but not surprised Dr.
King.
But disappointment would never allow Dr. King to abandon the quest for racial
diversity in elementary and secondary education. Certainly, the changed
landscape of public education since 1968 and the fact that schools now
voluntarily strive for diversity would encourage Dr. King164 And so despite his
frustrations Dr. King would promote enforcement of the cobbled-together
Parents Involved “majority” decision as a matter of principle.
Above all, Dr. King called for reshaping fundamental attitudes and beliefs about
the worth of people of color, who in less than fifty years, are likely to be the
majority of Americans.165 These changing demographics create an urgent need
to re-shape our educational system to accomplish “transformative
desegregation” of the heart and mind, consistent with Dr. King’s spoken and
written messages. Transformative desegregation is “intellectual
desegregation,”166 intended to go beyond the models of desegregation that
emphasize simply putting children of different races in close physical proximity,
or avoiding harm to whites.167
Transformative desegregation first requires that students unlearn the racial
superiority/inferiority model, a process described by bell hooks as
“decolonization.”168 Second, transformative desegregation requires curricula
changes in public education to undo the harm caused by the distorted images of
people of color shaped in the crucible of oppression. Finally, Dr. King would
promote equity in school financing to transform the learning environment into
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one that recognizes the human dignity and worth of each child. 169 In other
words, he would embrace strategies to achieve both transformative
desegregation and financial equity.
VI. A Concluding Prayer for Relief: Community, Not Chaos
While the end of legal segregation during Dr. King’s lifetime marked a major
paradigm shift, it also exposed the seemingly intractable and tangled roots of
racism and the resulting political disenfranchisement, economic disparities, and
other social injustices. In the field of education, the Court, after years of
calculated delay, charged local school boards with the affirmative duty to
eliminate racial discrimination “root and branch.”170 But although the Civil
Rights Movement cut the branches of de jure segregation, the roots of racism
run deep throughout the nation’s past and present. Glaring vestiges of the Jim
Crow era still remain in the racially segregated and under-financed public
school systems that struggle to educate students in both the North and South.
Dr. King’s last writings suggest his weariness with recalcitrance, yet he died in
the midst of struggle. As a pastor and civil rights leader, Dr. King modeled his
action and teaching after the Old Testament prophetic messengers who he
frequently wrote about as a theology student.171 Dr. King admired the Old
Testament’s biblical prophets, because they challenged the failure of the
political and social order of their time and sparked “rebellion and renewal
motivated by prophetic truth.”172 Like the biblical prophets, Dr. King criticized
169
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the moral decline and institutional failures that resulted from what he described
as “the complexity of human motives and the reality of sin on every level of
man’s existence . . . [and of] collective evil.”173 Dr. King’s leadership over the
Montgomery Improvement Association’s 381-day bus boycott, which resulted
in economic and judicial forces coming to bear to end segregation in local
public transportation,174 and his final speech in Memphis, exemplified his role
as a prophetic messenger.175

Near the end of his life, Dr. King challenged individuals and societies to escape
from the deeply entrenched social and economic injustice that resulted in
wounded spirits. He sought to show low-income white Americans the need to
join with African Americans to petition the government for an economic bill of
rights, calling for “an all-out world war against poverty.”176 He demanded that
black clergy and the black middle class join in the struggle for an end to racism
and economic injustice in the public and private sectors.177 But his charge to
every American was to
be dissatisfied until those that live on the outskirts of hope are brought
into the metropolis of daily security . . . until the dark yesterdays of
segregated schools [are] transformed into bright tomorrows of quality,
integrated education . . . until integration is not seen as a problem but as
an opportunity to participate in the beauty of diversity.178
And so Dr. King would motivate us to continue to demand a just society—“if
democracy is to live, segregation must die.”179
In the field of education, Dr. King was not calling for a few years of courtsupervised desegregation and affirmative action. He called people to nonviolently demand systemic change, which required teaching new paradigms of
racial equality and social and economic justice. Moreover, for Dr. King, and
even for the Court in Brown, the de jure/de facto distinction relied on in Parents
Involved was not the decisive factor in the quest to dismantle vestiges of the old
paradigm of racial hierarchy “branch and root.”180 What mattered was
protecting children from psychological and spiritual death.
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Dr. King’s prolific writing provides a roadmap. Published after his death, he
authored an essay laying out plans for a reinvigorated nonviolent campaign for
an economic bill of rights.181 He embraced the positive meaning of Black
Power,182 but insisted that violence would not lead to genuine economic and
social equality. As Dr. King came to terms with the more militant Black Power
movement, he continued to encourage African Americans to see their struggle
as one against the ideology of racism and not against white Americans. He
insisted that non-violent demands for change by a multiracial “coalition of
conscience” would achieve more than violence.183
Finally, Dr. King the preacher would encourage us to strengthen our inner self
for battle. He would pray for strength to act. He would push to reconnect the
spiritual with the political. As Cook explains, “The substantive religious and
spiritual principle of love for the least of these was communicated [by Dr. King]
to both religionist and humanist in a way that put each in harmony with the
other.”184 He would reclaim the moral high ground by returning to the first
principles of the Civil Rights Movement: justice, peace, equality, and love. He
would resist any tendency to lean away from justice. He would reject
colorblind constitutionalism as a neutral legal principle.
And so, our prayer for relief should request Dr. King to say, Amen, to the
justices in Parents Involved that demonstrated fidelity to the principle of racial
diversity in public education.
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